Transcript – Panel Discussion 19 November 2025

Can the world live with nuclear weapons – and what happens if we cannot?

Listen: Recording from the panel discussion (in Swedish).

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Clara: [00:00:01] A very warm welcome to this panel discussion! Today we will dive into an issue that has not only shaped international politics for eight decades, but that also continues to shape our present in ways many of us might have thought belonged to history. Since the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear weapons have come to symbolize two things: humanity’s most destructive and inhumane capability, and the ultimate demonstration of power. This is a legacy that still casts a long shadow over our security thinking. Because even though much has changed since the 1940s, the nuclear weapons issue is anything but outdated. Today’s conflicts and explicit nuclear threats, the modernization of arsenals, and rapid technological development make the issue more relevant than it has been for a long time. At the same time, the fundamental humanitarian and ethical dilemmas that have always surrounded nuclear weapons remain. Can humanity really base its security on the threat of total mass destruction? Sweden is no exception in this story. From the earlier Swedish nuclear weapons programme in the 1950s, through decades of disarmament diplomacy, to today’s membership in a nuclear weapons alliance, our position has changed. By combining historical insights with today’s security policy reality, we hope to shed light on one of the most charged and crucial questions of our time: Can the world live with nuclear weapons? And what happens if we cannot? My name is Clara Gullman Levin and I will be moderating this conversation. I am Communications Manager at Swedish Doctors Against Nuclear Weapons.

On the panel we have: - Victor Galaz, researcher at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, - Josefin Lind, Secretary General of Swedish Doctors Against Nuclear Weapons, - Emma Rosengren, researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and Stockholm University, and - Tytti Erästö, Senior Researcher at SIPRI. My first question goes to you, Victor. Since 1945, over 2,000 nuclear weapons have been detonated in tests around the world. Could you briefly tell us about that, about the people you’ve met, and the consequences of those test explosions?

Victor: [00:02:18] I’ve met the people who were evacuated. I’ve met their descendants. I’ve seen how they live today and I’ve come to understand the effects. To begin with, of course, there is the radioactive fallout that is still present in the soil, in vegetation and animal life, in the sea and on the seabed. That is one effect, and it means that these people cannot return and live where they grew up, where they have their history and roots. The second effect is that this fallout and radioactivity risk being released again in connection with climate change. Rising sea levels or strong winds and storms can stir up radioactivity that is stored or lying dormant and bring it back up, causing new damage. The third aspect is perhaps the most difficult and complex: the social price these people pay because of forced relocations, trauma that continues across generations, and the longing to see their homes again. All of that remains. So we’re talking both about ecological and environmental aspects, and absolutely about the social and psychological aspects that are still present. We often think of nuclear weapons and immediately think of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as something very distant. But this is everyday life and reality for many people around the world even today.

Clara: [00:04:02] I actually didn’t know about those climate-related consequences – that radioactive fallout can “come back”, so to speak. What ethical questions do you think this raises regarding environmental justice and colonial power relations?

Victor: [00:04:17] That’s also a very big question.

Clara: [00:04:19] We work with big questions.

Victor: [00:04:21] I understand that. What is absolutely obvious here is the enormous injustice in this issue, which also has a clear parallel to the climate question. The people who are most vulnerable and hardest hit have had the least influence and the fewest resources to deal with this. On the one hand, it’s about recognition – having what they’ve been subjected to officially acknowledged. You know this well: to have it formally recognized that “you have been affected by this, and we take your concerns seriously” – concerns about possible health effects, for example. That’s one part. The second part is compensation – the right to redress. And these issues often disappear from the debate, I think. I took part in something – if you google it, you can find it – a Nobel meeting held in Chicago this July, called something like the Nobel Assembly on the Future of Nuclear Weapons, or similar. Nobel laureates and researchers gathered to sign a declaration on nuclear weapons risks. I was there, and it was striking how the debate kept revolving around security aspects – the great powers and how they should control each other, nuclear arms control and deterrence – and almost nothing about people’s everyday lives and how those affected should be compensated for what has happened. This simply vanished from sight. There were a few people who tried to say, “We can’t just talk about politics and security policy and the UN and the US and Russia – we also need to talk about the people living with this reality today.” But that disappeared. So in that sense, climate justice and “nuclear justice”, if we use that term, are extremely closely linked. It sounds very dark – and I do have some bright spots to mention as well, but we can perhaps come back to those later.

Clara: [00:06:24] Yes, because in the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons there is a section that addresses compensation and assistance to those who have been affected. But even there, states can’t really agree on who should provide compensation and how it should be done. So it’s a very heavily debated issue. Why do you think it’s so important that we continue to talk about nuclear weapons in this way, and about their consequences? Any thoughts on that?

Victor: [00:06:59] Yes, there is an obvious answer, and then a more complicated one. The obvious answer is that the memory and knowledge of nuclear weapons and their consequences are extremely important to carry into the future. There is a memory of what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also in the Marshall Islands, French Polynesia and Kazakhstan, that is eroding. The people who have experienced this and felt it in their own bodies are dying, and that memory is disappearing. That’s one part. The other part is that we often think it’s the general public that needs to remember this. But in my view, even experts – security experts – are very poorly informed about these issues and don’t understand the legacy of nuclear testing in Oceania or Kazakhstan. That knowledge is missing, and then these stories and testimonies disappear.

Clara: [00:07:59] And unfortunately, it becomes even more abstract in a way.

Victor: [00:08:03] Yes, exactly.

Clara: [00:08:05] I’d like to move on to Emma now – and we will come back to you, Victor. Sweden had quite far-reaching plans to develop its own nuclear weapons. What historical factors contributed to Sweden ultimately choosing to refrain from nuclear weapons – to refrain from developing its own? And how has that shaped Sweden’s foreign policy identity, in your view?

Emma: [00:08:31] Thank you! I’m happy to be here, I just want to say that first. Then I’d like to pick up on what you talked about regarding the consequences of nuclear weapons use. That’s why it’s so valuable to have an exhibition like the one we can see here today. I was thinking about these consequences when I lectured on nuclear weapons here at Stockholm University just a couple of weeks ago. I was teaching on an introductory course in International Relations, in a module on international security. I remember when I took that same course in the early 2000s and we had a lecture on nuclear weapons. I wasn’t involved in organizing anything then; I was just a student. I thought, “Why do we even need to study this? Do nuclear weapons still exist?” I was born in the early 1980s, and I remember as a child being afraid of nuclear war. But then that fear somehow faded away. Now, when I meet students taking a similar course 20 years later, they are super interested in the nuclear issue and see it as extremely topical. And sadly, as you pointed out, something has happened with this question. So I’ll start with that observation. In my research, I’ve looked specifically at Sweden’s history. I asked the students in my lecture how many of them knew that Sweden actually had a nuclear weapons programme in the 1950s. Not many did. How is it in this room? Most of you probably do know about that programme.

Emma: [00:10:12] The programme took shape quite soon after nuclear weapons were used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This was a time when neutrality policy created an argument in favour of nuclear weapons: Sweden wasn’t part of any alliance, so we needed the strongest weapons available, and we had to produce them ourselves. “We must have our own weapons, and therefore we simply need to acquire nuclear weapons so that our neutrality policy is credible and backed up.” That was a widespread view in Sweden at the time. The programme for Swedish “atomic weapons”, as they were called then, was extremely secret. The public didn’t know, and not many decision-makers either, perhaps. But in 1954 the Supreme Commander came out and publicly argued that Sweden ought to acquire nuclear weapons. That was the start of one of the most intense security-policy debates in Sweden in the 20th century. It engaged civil society organizations. It split the Social Democratic Party, which was in government, into two camps. It split Parliament into two very clear sides: those who were in favour of Swedish nuclear weapons and those who were against. Organizations were founded that worked exclusively against Swedish nuclear weapons. Study circles were held, especially in the Social Democratic Women’s Association, on this issue. It mobilised a great many people. This made things tricky for the governing Social Democrats: what do we do when some people really want nuclear weapons and others are strongly opposed? Tage Erlander, who was Prime Minister, probably had many sleepless nights pondering this. He found a sort of solution: “We don’t need to decide yet.”

Emma: [00:12:13] Towards the end of the 1950s he said, in effect, “We’ll wait and see. We’ll see what happens in international disarmament negotiations,” which were beginning to take shape. “We’ll wait until we know more about whether we can even acquire these weapons, if we have the technology to complete the programme.” So in typical Social Democratic fashion, they postponed the decision. And that gave the opposition more time to mobilise. Which, from the perspective of those who didn’t want Sweden to have nuclear weapons, was quite clever. They simply got more time. At the same time, things were happening internationally. Sweden joined a UN disarmament body called the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Alva Myrdal was appointed Sweden’s disarmament negotiator. And in some way, disarmament engagement became a central profile for Swedish foreign policy. That made it harder to acquire nuclear weapons while also being deeply engaged in nuclear disarmament. During the 1960s, an active foreign policy emerged in Sweden, and disarmament became a very central part of it. So when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, was negotiated in 1968 in that Eighteen-Nation Committee, Sweden signed it as a non-nuclear weapon state. And that was essentially the end of the plans. Sweden was then legally bound under international law not to acquire nuclear weapons. But it was a long road to get there. And Sweden was not very happy with the content of that treaty.

Clara: [00:13:59] That sounds familiar, yes. It’s really interesting to hear about this active disarmament policy – it looks a bit different today, you could say. But do you think Sweden would have been safer if we had developed nuclear weapons? That may be a leading question to you.

Emma: [00:14:24]

Well, to start with, I can simply say: no, I don’t think so. When you sent me this question in advance, I thought I could use some arguments from the Swedish nuclear weapons debate to illustrate the issue historically, so I don’t have to sit here and take a personal position as a researcher – that’s much more comfortable. During the debate, Östen Undén, the Foreign Minister, stated already in the mid-1950s that if we acquire nuclear weapons we won’t create more security; rather, we’ll create insecurity, because we risk making Sweden a target. The whole point of having nuclear weapons was to make Sweden safer – to have the strongest possible weapons so that nobody would dare attack us or draw us into a conflict between the great powers. But he said, “No, it’s more likely to have the opposite effect. We become a target if we acquire these weapons.” That might have been a radical position at the time, but over the years it became widely accepted. There was broad consensus in Sweden that nuclear weapons lead to greater insecurity. So there was a renegotiation of what “security” meant in relation to nuclear weapons. Another common argument, often put forward by the Social Democratic Women’s Association, was that if Sweden acquired nuclear weapons, we would set a very bad example. We would look foolish, essentially, in international politics. Sweden would be seen as doing something wrong, and we would also set an example for others: “If Sweden does it – Sweden, which has a fairly good reputation internationally – then anyone can do it.” That could have knock-on effects, they argued. They also argued that refraining from nuclear weapons could strengthen Sweden’s role as an international mediator. So there was substantial debate around whether nuclear weapons would make us more secure or not.

Clara: [00:16:41] It’s quite interesting, this question of security and whether nuclear weapons make us safer, because that is the argument put forward today. So, Tytti, I’m thinking about deterrence. When we talk about nuclear weapons, we talk about deterrence and that it should be the ultimate protection. But is deterrence an effective strategy for preserving peace?

Tytti: [00:17:12] Deterrence is based on the threat to annihilate your opponent. Clearly no one can take such an existential threat lightly, and in that sense nuclear deterrence can be said to “work”. But is this a good strategy for preserving peace? No, I don’t think so. If nuclear deterrence fails and there is a nuclear war, the consequences would be catastrophic. And this would not be war in the way we normally understand it – a battle in which one side eventually emerges as the victor. There are no winners in a nuclear war. Entire cities and civilizations can be destroyed, and in the case of the massive US and Russian arsenals, the entire world. There is, of course, a theory of limited nuclear war that is currently very popular and that also underpins NATO’s strategic nuclear missions. According to this theory, escalation can be managed through limited nuclear strikes. It assumes that a limited nuclear strike by one side could force the other side to back down, or that a limited retaliatory strike could have the same effect. There is a lot of wishful thinking in this. In reality, there is no way to know whether you will be able to force the other side to give up, or whether the escalation step you take will simply provoke them to escalate further. In other words, nuclear deterrence is an extremely dangerous strategy, with which some governments are playing with the lives of their own citizens and those of other countries. Yes, nuclear deterrence may have contributed to a certain stability between the great powers, but it has almost failed several times, and it can fail completely in the future.

Clara: [00:19:46] I assume that when these ideas or strategies about “limited” nuclear war are being developed, people are not really thinking about the consequences for climate and human beings either. But that’s another question. I imagine many people might agree that nuclear deterrence is dangerous or a bad thing – but that we have no alternative, because the opponent is threatening us with nuclear weapons. What would you say to that?

Tytti: [00:20:18] Yes, that is exactly the argument we hear a lot nowadays, especially from those who claim that they simultaneously support nuclear disarmament. Every state that relies on nuclear deterrence is participating in making nuclear threats – usually implicitly. Russia has made these threats explicit, through statements signalling readiness to use nuclear weapons, with the purpose of deterring NATO from directly intervening in the war in Ukraine. Russia knows it is weak compared to NATO. Contrary to what many think, NATO is clearly superior to Russia in terms of conventional military power – if you look at defence spending, the number of major weapons systems and active military personnel, even without counting the United States. This seems to have escaped many Europeans: Russia’s nuclear threats are not driven by its strength, but by its relative weakness. The good news here is that NATO is already militarily strong, and Russia is clearly deterred by NATO. The bad news is that precisely for this reason, Russia tries to compensate for its conventional weakness with nuclear weapons. And NATO will not solve this by further strengthening its military power, whether conventional or nuclear.

Clara: [00:22:24] Josefin, since 2024 Sweden has been a member of NATO. How has NATO changed Sweden’s stance on nuclear disarmament – or do we still have an independent foreign policy? What would you say?

Josefin: [00:22:41] Do we have a stance on nuclear weapons? Yes, absolutely. I think it has changed much more than we really grasp. From being a country that, at least in recent decades, has wanted to present itself as a strong voice for disarmament, and with a disarmament tradition that perhaps stems from that earlier period Emma described, we’ve now entered NATO without any reservations and accepted all aspects of NATO, including the nuclear dimension. We’ve heard many times how Sweden has changed its voting patterns at the UN, for example. Sweden can no longer support resolutions on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons if those resolutions also say that therefore nuclear weapons must never be used. Sweden cannot say that anymore, now that we support NATO’s nuclear policy. We’ve also seen changes in statements. Since 2003 Sweden has stopped criticizing all countries’ nuclear modernization; now we only criticize China. Previously, Sweden criticized all nuclear-armed countries’ modernization and build-up programmes. These are just a few concrete examples. Sweden has also been part of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group from the start. We took part in NATO’s nuclear exercise this October, where Swedish Gripen aircraft have reportedly escorted and protected US planes that can carry nuclear weapons. So in those exercises Sweden is not protecting its population from nuclear weapons; we are protecting the nuclear weapons. So yes, things have absolutely changed. We’ve also heard that NATO’s presence is increasing at disarmament conferences at the UN. There are certain talking points and positions that all NATO member states are expected to express and support, so the space is shrinking. But the space is also shrinking because Sweden allows it to shrink. NATO is not a supranational organization, so we could maintain our independence and be difficult and stubborn if we wanted to. So far, we haven’t wanted to.

Clara: [00:25:16] What do you think are the greatest dangers in this shift – the changes you describe in Sweden’s disarmament policy?

Josefin: [00:25:22] What we’re seeing is essentially the same debate that was conducted in the 1950s – for or against. The difference is that it’s not Swedish nuclear weapons this time, but American ones. There is uncertainty about Sweden’s position that could make us a target, or at least increase the risk of us becoming one. What we need for our security – if Russia is now seen as the main enemy – is not uncertainty, because uncertainty creates insecurity. What creates security is clarity and principled positions. One danger is that it becomes unclear whether Sweden might allow nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in the future, which would further increase our insecurity.

Clara: [00:26:11] Sweden’s disarmament policy and the debate around it have changed radically. But did this begin now in 2024, when Sweden applied for NATO membership, or did it start earlier? When did this shift begin?

Emma: [00:26:32] There isn’t really a single day when it all started.

Clara: [00:26:37] You’re not like Peter Hultqvist who suddenly “realised”—

Emma: [00:26:39] No, I didn’t just have a revelation in the shower. What we can see is that during the Cold War, disarmament policy was central – as I mentioned earlier – to Swedish foreign and security policy, and also to how we saw ourselves as Swedes: “We work for nuclear disarmament.” This was the case regardless of which parties were in government. Inga Thorsson, for example, was a key figure against Swedish nuclear weapons. She later replaced Alva Myrdal as Sweden’s disarmament negotiator, and she remained in that role even when the government constellation changed. That shows there was some kind of cross-party consensus on this kind of policy. After the end of the Cold War, things started to change institutionally. The last dedicated disarmament ambassador we had was Maj-Britt Theorin; after her, the role disappeared. A disarmament delegation at the Foreign Ministry, which included politicians and supported disarmament work, was also disbanded in the 1990s. There were still certain initiatives – for example the New Agenda Coalition in the late 1990s, where Sweden actively worked for nuclear disarmament in international negotiations, and the Blix Commission, which was another sign that Sweden was doing something on disarmament. But then, around 2008–2009, things started to change again. Sweden left some of these large initiatives it had participated in, such as the New Agenda Coalition. It backed away quite sharply from earlier positions. Then things turned again when Margot Wallström became Foreign Minister and made disarmament part of her feminist foreign policy. Sweden rejoined various initiatives. It wasn’t allowed back into the New Agenda Coalition, but it joined other groups. Sweden also helped negotiate the TPNW – the nuclear ban treaty. But then Sweden didn’t join it, because yet another debate erupted, splitting the Social Democrats again: should we join the ban treaty or not? That debate is worth studying in its own right. So to answer your question – that was a long answer – no, this didn’t begin now. This is a process that has been unfolding since the 1990s, I would say, and we also have to see EU membership as a central part of that broader development. It’s complicated.

Clara: [00:29:31] It certainly sounds complicated – but also very interesting to hear that change is a slow process that you might not see clearly in the moment, but only understand over a longer period.

Emma: [00:29:46] What you can say is that the view on deterrence has changed quite radically in recent years – from the Ban Treaty discussion up to today. The stance on deterrence has softened, I’d say.

Clara: [00:30:03] Softened? How do you mean?

Emma: [00:30:05] That it has become possible to join an alliance that relies on nuclear weapons and thus on deterrence. The argument has perhaps not always been “we must have nuclear weapons to be safe”, but it has become “we must be in NATO to be safe”. And once you are there, you end up in the situation Josefin describes – you take part in nuclear exercises and so on. That’s perhaps one thing that has happened along with the membership.

Clara: [00:30:39] Maybe we should open up the floor for some questions? Yes, you.

Question: Joining NATO… Agreeing to NATO and nuclear weapons feels like a double bind. Is the only way back for Sweden to actually leave something – to leave NATO?

Clara: Is your question directed to anyone in particular, or to all of them?

Question: No, to anyone who feels called to answer.

Clara: [00:31:01] Josefin?

Josefin: Yes, that’s a very difficult question, because nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are an increasingly central part of NATO. But according to the North Atlantic Treaty, on which NATO rests, nuclear weapons are not mentioned at all. It was only in 2010, in the Strategic Concept, that NATO began to describe itself as a “nuclear alliance”. That concept is a political document, not a charter like the North Atlantic Treaty. So formally there is nothing in the membership itself that says you must support nuclear weapons policy. Politically, it is very difficult, because NATO and nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as synonymous, of course. But as I said before, NATO is not a supranational organisation. In practice, all countries have veto rights. If Sweden had joined and said “we will not participate in the Nuclear Planning Group”, then we wouldn’t have to. And even the nuclear exercises are voluntary – this time there were about 14 countries participating out of 32. It is voluntary. You will, of course, be perceived as difficult and troublesome. Norway and Denmark have been quite troublesome at times. Denmark had something called the “footnote policy” in the 1980s: when NATO talked about nuclear weapons, Denmark added a footnote saying “Denmark does not support this.” So if you want to, you can do things like that. It would be easier if a group of countries acted together, though. There are also different national policies: Finland has legislation against nuclear weapons on its territory; Lithuania and Spain as well; Denmark and Norway have different policy solutions. So it’s very diverse within NATO.

Emma: [00:32:51] I can add that I’ve done some research on Sweden and Finland, and their political discussions around NATO membership and around the nuclear ban treaty from 2016 onwards. What you can see in public statements is that they still declare support for nuclear disarmament. There is nothing that formally prevents member states from pushing disarmament issues. I think Norway is an interesting example, as you mentioned, Josefin – with the humanitarian initiative in 2013–2014, which led into the process that produced the nuclear ban treaty. Norway has been a NATO member for a long time. So there is nothing legal that stops states from doing that; but there can be political obstacles.

Josefin: [00:33:48] NATO itself also says that its goal is a world free of nuclear weapons – but that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

Clara: [00:33:57] Wait, you’ll get a microphone.

Question: Hi! I have a question – my name is Jonas. When it comes to the stationing of nuclear weapons in Sweden, where do we stand today? I seem to remember listening to Defence Minister Pål Jonson, and he has never really given a clear answer on Sweden’s position. I recall him saying something like, “Across the table, we haven’t agreed on anything.” So it feels very uncertain, Sweden’s stance on nuclear weapons in Sweden. Do you know more? That’s my question. Thanks. Who wants to take that?

Clara: It wasn’t directed to anyone specific?

Josefin: [00:34:46] No, I don’t think anyone truly knows.

Clara: [00:34:48] You can pretend you know.

Josefin: [00:34:49] You probably have to call Pål Jonson. But during the parliamentary negotiations on NATO membership, the Social Democrats and the Moderates shook hands on there being no nuclear weapons in Sweden. So if you ask the Social Democrats, they’ll say there’s a gentleman’s agreement on that. But we also heard that Prime Minister Kristersson has started to hedge, now talking about no nuclear weapons in Sweden “in peacetime”, but he doesn’t want to discuss wartime. The Social Democrats say that under the Non-Proliferation Treaty there can be no nuclear weapons in Sweden – but we know there are always loopholes, and that interpretation is increasingly being softened. So it’s very unclear. Finland, Lithuania and Spain have legislation banning it, and Denmark and Norway have different policy solutions. Sweden didn’t take the opportunity to negotiate this explicitly in the Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US either – to write into the agreement that nuclear weapons may not be brought in. It was left as “understood”, because Sweden had said publicly that nuclear weapons would not be brought into Sweden. So it’s very unclear and fuzzy.

Question: [00:36:10] Is that political opportunism, or incompetence, or lack of will – or is it just that they want to keep all doors open?

Josefin: [00:36:20] I don’t think it’s incompetence.

Clara: [00:36:25] Let me add something. It’s a very important question you’re asking. I don’t know if Thomas, who is sitting at the back, wants to add something – he has written about these questions. But what we can say now is that there doesn’t seem to be any current US interest in stationing nuclear weapons in Sweden. That’s worth keeping in mind. The problem is that we don’t know what will happen in the future. What will the interest look like in ten years? None of us know. And then it might be smart to have national legislation if you don’t want nuclear weapons on your territory – like Finland, for example. And the fact that we don’t know what will happen in the future is something we really need to think about. I don’t know whether that has been thought through.

Question: [00:37:16] No, I don’t know either.

Emma: [00:37:17] No.

Question: [00:37:20]

There’s another aspect: the current political situation with Trump in the White House, which creates extreme security uncertainty globally. And now we’re also going to have American bases in Sweden. I don’t really understand why that is – it seems there’s plenty of reason to be worried.

Josefin: Yes.

Clara: We have a question from Pierre Schori.

Question (Pierre Schori): [00:37:46]

I’m wondering: the Social Democrats and the Moderates say they are against nuclear weapons on Swedish soil. Orally they are against – and we know what oral statements are worth. We had Hultqvist at the last party congress saying, “Never in my life will Sweden join NATO,” and we know how that turned out. So what we need is something in writing – a law or some written agreement. No discussions, no ambiguity. We cannot trust those people. And now we have a golden opportunity before next year’s election to demand from the parties, and from our prospective MPs that we believe will be on the lists, a clear commitment. We should start gnawing away at this damned nuclear weapons complex. Put them up against the wall, because we cannot trust what they’ve said so far. On top of that, with the Defence Cooperation Agreement, we don’t know anything. When an American commander was asked on his way to Berga last year, he didn’t know whether nuclear weapons would be brought there or not. There’s so much talk, but no clarity. That agreement should be paused in this situation, since we don’t have any clear information about anything.

Clara: [00:39:07] That wasn’t a question.

Question: No.

Clara: [00:39:10] Next question – Arron Tovish.

Question (Arron Tovish): [00:39:16] You'll have to pardon me. I don't speak Swedish well enough. You wouldn't like it if I tried, and I'm not sure I've followed everything that's been said up front, so I may step on something that someone's already said, and I apologize in advance. I have two questions.

The first question is: when the intermediate-range missiles were being deployed in Europe, a coordination of European peace movements developed, called END – European Nuclear Disarmament – and it played an important role in mobilizing opposition to those weapons.

My question now is: is there such coordination, particularly among the NATO countries in Europe, which is pretty much all the countries at this point, unfortunately? Is there a coordination on how to address NATO policy by the peace groups within the NATO countries? And if there isn’t, I think that’s an important first order of business – to create such coordination. Along with that, of course, would be to reach a consensus on what is the most effective way to go forward in terms of addressing the nuclear threat that NATO presents to Europe and the world. That’s my first question: whether such coordination exists. My second question is maybe not really a question. I feel that the focus on where weapons are deployed and how many are deployed, and often on the types of weapons, is a bit of a distraction. The key thing we need to be concerned about is: are the weapons actually going to be used? They were used twice – Hiroshima and Nagasaki – so we know they can be used, and we don’t want to see a third use. People often talk about “no first use”. I correct them and say “no third use”, because I worked for the City of Hiroshima as an executive advisor to the mayor of Hiroshima for 14 years. I’ve listened to the hibakusha, and it’s extremely important that we never lose track of how this whole thing got going: it got going by the use of nuclear weapons. We should be focusing more on under what circumstances there is absolutely no excuse for using nuclear weapons. I would say that is to actually start using them. I think this is something that Sweden looked at very seriously right up until the time they joined NATO, and it was looked at seriously in Norway and Finland as well. I think maybe there is potential for the Nordic countries, from within NATO, to start saying: “We need to discuss this, because this policy is dangerous. It’s essentially a bluff, but the bluffing itself is dangerous and stupid. It doesn’t give security.”

A better policy would be to say: “We’re never going to start a nuclear war. So you, Russia or China or whoever, don’t have to worry about us starting a nuclear war. You don’t have to think in terms of pre-empting us, because we’re not going to start it anyway.” I’ve talked too long. Thanks.

Clara: [00:43:18] What I would say is that there’s ICAN and IPPNW, and other organisations that operate in that way, but not specifically an “END” of that sort today. Then there are also specific organisations in different countries – like CND in the UK, as you know. Victor, did you want to add something?

Victor: [00:43:46] I want to challenge a little bit the assumption you have that we've only used nuclear weapons twice. I think it's an important part of communication to say that. No, actually – yes, they were used twice in war in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But in other parts of the world they were used many, many times – in the Marshall Islands, 67 times. And there were people living there, there were ecosystems, they were thriving. The legacy is still there. The same in French Polynesia. There is an estimate that shows something like 80% of French Polynesians lived in areas under nuclear fallout from these explosions. So I just wanted to make that point again – why it’s so important that we tell these stories and that the “end” of nuclear weapons use did not come in 1945. The legacy is much longer. The other thing I would urge people – because this is the first time I'm part of a public panel on nuclear weapons use, to be honest – my background is climate science, climate change, climate adaptation, climate risks. I see our communities working so much in silos, and it worries me, because these two questions are intimately connected in many, many ways, both in politics and in people’s realities. So how do we begin to bring these two conversations together? That is a huge, huge challenge for both of us, I think.

Emma: [00:45:18] I think it’s also especially important to talk about nuclear testing as use of nuclear weapons in a time where President Trump is actually talking about testing again. So challenging that assumption that “military use” is the only kind of use is extremely important.

Clara: [00:45:38] Gabriella… oh, Tytti.

Tytti: [00:45:41] I could say something in English? I agree with everything you said, except for the last part where you suggested that you might be able to reassure adversaries by saying we’re not going to use nuclear weapons against them. I think today it’s more complicated, because they may actually be even more concerned about conventional weapons – long-range precision-strike systems that, in their worst-case scenarios, could be used to undermine their nuclear deterrent and arsenals. So I think confidence-building should also relate to certain kinds of conventional weapons that are problematic. And on the previous question about nuclear weapons deployments on Swedish territory, I think the problem there – as Emma and others said – is not that anyone wants to deploy these weapons in peacetime. The problem I see is that many within NATO are discussing wartime plans to disperse these weapons around Europe to make them more survivable. That is thinking about nuclear war. If you want to prevent that, then it would really be good – as Josefin said – to have some kind of legislation to clearly state that we don’t want this, because that is preparation for a nuclear war.

Clara: [00:47:28] Gabriella?

Question (Gabriella Irstén): Hi, thank you so much. I’m Gabriella Irstén from the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society. The first part of my question is mainly to Emma, but of course everyone is welcome to answer if you have something to add. In your research, do you see a problem that my organisation and many others working against nuclear weapons experience today – namely that we have a hard time breaking into the current debate? We try to get into the media, but they constantly say no; they want the military perspective. Practically every week we try to get things out. Did one see the same problem in the 1950s and 60s? Maybe I romanticise it, because I’ve read a lot of your research. It seems like there were countless op-eds and events. Was it similar then, was it hard for one side to get out?

And a second question to all of you: do you have any tips on how we can break through this barrier that Swedish media represents today – at least from our perspective?

Emma: [00:48:30] Thank you, Gabriella. I don’t know if it was exactly the same back then, but it doesn’t look like it was difficult in the same way, because there were so many op-eds and events going on. When I began looking into these issues in the archives, I thought I would drown – two of my supervisors who are here can confirm that. There was an enormous amount of material. I was actually a bit surprised, when the NATO debate began, that there wasn’t more – that there weren’t more arguments against membership coming through in the public debate. Then I talked with you and others, and you described how difficult it was to get things published. Another important aspect, shown by other people’s research, is that many who did participate in the debate were subjected to quite harsh pushback in very problematic ways. Raising questions like “What happens now to Sweden’s ability to work for nuclear disarmament?” became almost synonymous with being a traitor to the country – which is, I think, taking it a bit far. But that was a label many people got, and I think it has a chilling effect and discourages many from taking part in the debate – including researchers. So today’s debate climate is a huge problem. We have party leaders who step down after a few weeks – clearly something is not working. I’ve looked at these debates from a feminist perspective, and it seems particularly difficult for women. Women may receive rape threats, for example, when they enter the debate. That is something that really does not benefit democracy or democratic discussion.

Clara: [00:50:33] We can come back to the second part of your question later. Beatrice Fihn – a quick question.

Question (Beatrice Fihn): [00:50:33] A question to Josefin about the exercise. If Swedish pilots participate – you train for something that may happen at some point in the future. If a US bomber with nuclear weapons is escorted by Swedish pilots and aircraft, helping to make it possible, and those weapons are used, that would be a war crime – I’m thinking about the mass killing of civilians and the disproportionate consequences under international law. Sweden is a party to the Rome Statute and a member of the International Criminal Court. Do you know if there is any discussion among pilots or within the armed forces right now about individual responsibility not to commit war crimes? Does the Supreme Commander answer questions about this? Can we have a discussion about what Swedish military personnel should participate in? And can we guarantee that the US – under Trump especially, but also under other administrations – will not drag Sweden into actions that would put our military leaders or our Prime Minister, Defence Minister or pilots in The Hague, in prison?

Josefin: [00:51:55] It’s a relevant question, and we don’t have an answer. I asked the previous Supreme Commander almost exactly that question at the Folk och Försvar national conference in Sälen: what happens if Swedish pilots escort nuclear-armed aircraft that kill hundreds of thousands or millions of Russian civilians? Could Swedish pilots then face war-crimes charges?

The answer was: “Yes, nuclear weapons are very dangerous and Russia has many of them.” You can’t get any straight answers. There is no forum where you can have a dialogue with the armed forces about this. You don’t get answers. But it’s good that we are talking about it now. We have tried to write op-eds and raise this issue, but it’s hard to get them published too. There’s something very distasteful about the fact that at the same time as this exercise was going on, the Swedish Foreign Minister was in Hiroshima, laying her children’s folded paper cranes at the memorial – exactly at the same time as the Defence Minister was standing watching Swedish planes escort nuclear-capable bombers. We don’t know the answer, but it’s absolutely a question worth continuing to ask. He was clearly uncomfortable. He did not enjoy receiving that question in that room. So if there are opportunities, I will keep asking that question there. And as you said, Emma – for future researchers this will be wonderful. It will be extremely easy to study; no one will drown in paper archives.

Clara: Many thanks to the panelists and to everyone who has listened.